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The Professional Ideals of the Lawyer. By HENRY WYN,,NS J-ZSUP. Ncl
York, G. A. Jennings Co. Inc., 1925. pp. xlii, 292.
Security Against War. By FR.4NCES KELLoR, and ANTONIA HATVANY,
collaborator. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1924. Vols. II, pp. ix, 851.
If the reader of a book-review is entitled to know what the author has
tried to do, how the author has succeeded, and what the reviewer thinks
of it, then I say at once, that Mliss Kellor has written a treatise to belittle,
if not defame, the League of Nations and the World Court. She has done
it with such painstaking research and dialectic skill, that her two volumes
constitute a veritable Borah Bible, or Isolationist Iliad. Her conclusions,
however, will not bear critical analysis, and in my judgment, are unwar-
ranted by the facts.
The League of Nations, like the United States of America, was formed
'after a war, for two main purposes; first, to promote peace, and second,
to promote progress. Miss Kellor deals only with the peace efforts of the
League. On scarcely a single count does she feel it possible to commend
the League, the Covenant, the Council, the Assembly, the Secretariat, or
any of their activities. Says Bliss Kellor:
"The centre of responsibility for the settlement of disputes under the
Peace Treaties is not the League of Nations, but the principal allied
powers." * * * "Machinery established under the Covenant to main-
tain peace, disregards sound principles of political organizations." * 0 0
"The real agent of the principal allied powers, is not the League, but the
Conference of Ambassadors."
But Miss Kellor specifies: The League is nothing but a "paW" of
France in the Saar Valley. It has only affected "a temporary peace" in
upper Silesia. It "neither prevented a war or settled a dispute", in the
case of Albania versus Jugo-Slavia. It so "befogged" the Italo-Greelc dis-
pute as "to enable the members of the Council to claim credit for moral
influence and for mobilising public opinion, and to attach to its endeavors
an importance wholly at variance with the facts". The adventure in
Fiume demonstrated "that the Covenant is a fragile instrument when called
upon to provide measures of national security against a great power". The
Polish invasion of Vilna resulted in elaborate efforts of the League to
"evade its duty". In the Memel case, the League acted merely "as the
tool of the allied Powers". The Aaland Island decision sacrificed "the
integrity of the Covenant". The transfer of Eupen and Malmedy to
Belgium proves the League to be an "autocratic international organiza-
tion". The quarrel between Poland and Czecho-Slovalia "disposed of Mr.
Wilson's theory", that "peoples and provinces are not to be bartered as
if they were mere chattels and pawns in the game". The League made
a "travesty" out of the plight of Armenia. In the record in respect to
the Asiatic problems "is found the beginning of the disillusion of small
states with the Covenant". The League is desirous of "extending the
European political system of which it is the agent, to South America'"
It is "autocratic"; it has "demonstrated its incapacity for Government";
its prestige and authority has been "shaken to the foundations"; its high
probity "has been endangered". It is, in fact, a "moral facade" to divert
attention from the punitive measures provided under the Peace Treaties.
The League, in fine, has been a "failure".
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So much for th6'reprehensibilities of the League as a whole. The record
of the Council has been especially nefarious. Being composed of the "past
masters of the old diplomacy", it has "arrogated to itself" important func-
tions that belong to the assembly. It is little more than "a pawn of the
strong powers". It is "autocratic". It has endeavored "to increase its
hold over the sovereignty of member states". It has even "disregardad the
provisions of the covenant". The Council, in short, is disqualified "to
maintain a judicial point of view, to act impartially or independently".
The Assembly, and all its works, is equally bad, despite the fact that the
actions it takes are "more or less perfunctory". The Secretariat is the
"tool" of the Council. The innuendo is made, that its activities are gov-
erned by political considerations. Miss Kellor gazes upon the Permanent
Court of International Justice, and finds it wanting. The first three dis-
putes to come before it were "much ado about nothing" and have "dero-
gated" from the prestige of the Tribunal. Even the Wimbledon award,
generally regarded as the Court's most important decision, "contributed
nothing to the maintenance of peace". Of the first eight issues submitted
to the Court, none, with but one possible exception "was really worthy of
the tribunal". A comparison of the questions submitted to the Court with
those withheld "indicates that states signatory to the Court's statute are
unwilling to submit to its jurisdiction their vital interests, including ques-
tions of territory and boundaries; minorities and their protection; repara-
tions and their adjustment; and matters affecting state sovereignty-the
four leading factors in the wars which have taken place since the Peace
Treaty was signed". The Court, in fine, is "an instrument of the League",
and its advisory opinions have "deflected justice in the interests of political
expediency".
In the foregoing, I have attempted fairly to present Miss Keller's con-
clusions in respect to the League and the Court. To most readers, these
will carry their own refutation; I cannot, however, let the following mis-
statements of fact pass without comment. I have picked them at random
from more than a hundred notes.
Says Miss Keller:
"In the United States it (the Covenant) is popularly referred to as an
American idea, but in Europe it is pointed out that there were five schemes
before the Peace Conference, and that the present Covenant represents a
compromise between British elasticity, and French definiteness; in which
the British draft prevailed over the French design".
The Covenant, on the contrary, is virtually an Anglo-American product.
The French are responsible for scarcely any constructive ideas embodied
in the final draft.
"Argentina is said to have resigned, but she has since paid up". Argen-
tina is still a member of the League". The League is the judge when a
state has fulfilled all its international obligations". On the contrary, the
sovereign members of the League are the sole judges of what constitutes
compliance with their obligations under the Covenant. Paragraph 3 of
Article 1 of the Covenant can bear no such construction as Miss Kellor
puts upon it.
"It is difficult to understand in what manner a representative (of the
United States) could take his place upon the Council, and a delegation
attend the Assembly, without being a party to the following activities:
1. Contribution of American funds raised by taxation of American prop-
erties to enforce the provisions of the Peace Treaty. 2. Responsibility for
all acts committed by the Council in the name of the League of Nations,
whether the American representative voted or not."
BOOK REVIEWS
The Congress of the United States, and not the League of Nations, is
the only power that can raise and expend taxes in the United States. There
is nothing in the Covenant that does or could suspend this power under
the United States Constitution. The United States is responsible for
nothing except the vote of her representative. If he withholds his vote,
the League can take no action whatsoever, except to investigate and report.
"In the 14 cases before the Court of Arbitration before the war, in each
and every instance the award was accepted by the parties, and there has
been no formal complaint as to non-execution". In the dispute of Venezuela,
with England, Italy and Germany, Herbert W. Bowen, the Counsel for
Venezuela, solemnly protested against the award of the Court, and Miss
Kellor will find this protest printed in the official records. She alco fails
to mention in this connection, although she makes amends for this later on,
that Secretary Hughes found it necessary to issue a vigorous protest against
the decision of this old Hague Court in our recent dispute with Norway.
Mliss Kellor quotes the South American publicist, Seftor Alvarez, evidently
with approval, when he says "according to the Monroe Doctrine, such an
occupation (by a European power of American territory) would not be
permitted with regard to an American State." Theodore Roosevelt said,
when President of the United States, that there was nothing in the Monroe
Doctrine which would prevent European nations from seizing South Ameri-
can territory, as a punitive measure, provided the occupation was not
permanent.
From the foregoing, it is evident that Miss Kellor not only opposes the
Democratic position on the League of Nations, but the Republican position
on the World Court But she is not wholly negative. She holds aloft the
banner with a strange device of "Isolation". She is willing to revive the old
Hague conferences, to outlaw war, and to go back to the Hague Court cre-
ated by the first Hague Conference of 1899, which every succeeding Amer-
ican administration has tried to supplant with a better tribunal.
Miss Kellor would perhaps tolerate the new Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, if the Pepper or other Senatorial nullifying reservations
were affixed. But even so, she says that "there is no reason to believe that
States will be induced thereby to submit their disputes to the Court". In-
deed, Miss Kellor has so little fear that America will go into the Court of
Justice, that she tells us, in a very naive footnote, that when, last year, the
Foreign Relations Committee was holding its hearings on the Court, and
such national organizations as The United States Chamber of Commerce,
The American Federation of Labor, The Federal Council of Churches of
Christ in America, the Federation of Women's Clubs, the American Legion,
the American Bar Association, appeared in its behalf, "The opposition,
believing there was no likelihood of the measure being passed, agreed not
to waste the effort or time of the Senate Committee, by presenting their
views".
If, thus far, I have been compelled to deal adversely with Miss Kellor,
I would not do her the injustice of failing to note the wealth of detailed
information she has presented throughout every chapter as to the worh at
Geneva and the Hague. Nowhere else is the tale so completely and ex-
haustively told; nor would I fail to give Miss Kellor due praise for the
rare intellectual ability with which she has pursued her thesis. She has,
moreover, obeyed all the amenities of courteous advocacy, by not dezcending
to diatribe or personalities. If I am compelled to add that she is an adept
in making the worse appear the better course, I am sure she is entitled to
whatever measure of pseudo-admiration such abilities deserve. Her
volumes will undoubtedly be referred to as authority by many future irrec-
oncilable Senators, when attempting to thwart progress in the halls of
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Congress. Fortunately, however, the treatise is too long, and makes too
hard reading, to have much effect upon the popular mind.I The incontestable fact remains, however, that, owing to the inventions
of steam and electricity, which have annihilated time and space, the physical
world has become so small, and the moral and intellectual and commercial
world so large, that hereafter only an international organization can pos-
sibly cope with international affairs. The casual machinery by which in-
ternational affairs are now conducted can little longer block the full em-
ployment of permanent machinery, for the simple reason that permanent
machinery, as everybody knows, is always more effective than casual ma-
chinery. The League of Nations and the World Court are the most com-
prehensive, promising, and permanent measures yet devised to do the world's
work. If we have to scrap them, we shall have to create them over again,
Miss Keller and her isolationist friends to the contrary notwithstanding.
New York City. HAMILTON HOLT
The Anatomy of the Law. By ADOLPH J. RODENBECK. Boston, Little
Brown & Co., 1925. pp. xi, 292.
This is an attempt to present a classification under which all the law
can be brought into scientific arrangement. To the reviewer the attempt
seems a failure, when viewed as a whole. So, however, does every other
attempt which he has thus far run across. Perhaps the trouble lies in his
understanding or misunderstanding of the term "scientific". If the classi-
fications used are to be both comprehensive and mutually exclusive, accord-
ing to good logical doctrine, the reviewer doubts if law will ever be so
classified. If the categories are to be merely groupings in which the same
material might appear more than once and perhaps be developed from
different points of view, the only question becomes one of convenience.
One may share the feeling that Anglo-American law, especially in the
non-contract field, has been lacking in systematic treatment, and may share
the desire to reach broader generalizations than are to be found in a cyclo-
pedic presentation, without accepting the view that what is commonly
meant by "systematic" or "scientific" treatment of "the law" as a whole
is in itself either valuable or possible. The Europeans seem to have sought
system often at the expense of reality. Even our own "unification of con-
tract law" in the later nineteenth century has obscured the complexity of
operation of a rule under the simplicity of its statement, and at tinies-
as with acceptance in insurance contracts-has obscured an actual diver-
sity of rule. And the widening of generalization beyond the point where
each generalization touches chartable fact at a goodly portion of its
career, is dubious to dream of, and more dubious to put in practice.
The author's attempt only purports to outline main heads. This limita-
tion of objective keeps him from colliding with (and perhaps from be-
coming fully conscious of) the real difficulties of the problem, those of
showing exactly how the overwhelming welter of material is to be fitted
into his outline. He urges that we be not too nice in dealing with border
cases, but simply put them one place or the other, which is sense, but only
touches a small part of the problem. His own classification turns espe-
cially upon the division of each topic into its general and special phases;
and upon division of each general phase into theoretical ("nature, origin,
development, functions, purpose") and practical. Substantive and adjec.
tive are major subdivisions; public and private are sub-major subdivisions
under each. Beyond this the classification becomes to the reviewer largely
meaningless, except possibly in terms of the detail which is not presented,
How, for instance, can we tell what fits under the general head of the
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private side of the special phase of substantive law, as distinguished from
the general phase of substantive law? The author's suggestion of contract
law as falling into occupa.tional and von-occ pational is welcome; on the
other hand, the further subdivision of occupational into principal and ac-
cessory seems to promise nothing. The book is marred by the intrusion
of Tennysonian sentiments and not particularly illuminating second-hand
historical material into space that might have been given to working out
the classification into more concrete and detailed form.
Columbia University, School of Law KARL N. LLnivrmw
Selected Cases Illustrating the Law of Contracts. By A. CEcIL C~u'onN;
and FRANcIS M. CAPORN. Fourth Edition. Londoa, Stevens & Sons,
1925. pp. -=*, 1030.
As the name shows, this is a volume of illustrative cases. There is no
attempt to show the development of the law historically. Every case is
preceded by a statement of the general rule that it is supposed to illustrate.
The chapter headings correspond with those in Anson on Contract. In
addition there are chapters on Agency, 70 pp.; Bills and Notes, 80 pp.;
Sales, 120 pp.; Carriers, 60 pp.; Insurance, 35 pp.; and Suretyship, 20 pp.
It will be apparent to any student of American casebooks that the service
rendered by this book is comparatively limited. It is a reasonable repre-
sentation of the present case law of a single jurisdiction. As a basis for
forecasting how the courts of that jurisdiction will decide in the future,
it is not as good as are the American casebooks. It forms, however, a
convenient collection of modern English cases, all of which are familiar
to American students. Only one case is from the American reports. The
volume opens with Fitch e. Snedaker.
Yale University, School of Law AnTHun L. Coni
Code of Ethics. By EDGAR L. HEEaMANCE. Burlington, Vt., Free Press
Publishing Co., 1924. pp. viii, 525.
During the last forty years the lawyers of the United States have be-
come increasingly conscious of the failure of many of their members so to
act as to reflect credit on the profession. Impelled by the consciousness
of this situation and of the evil results to the profession at large and to
the public, lawyers, as individuals and in groups, have sought to set the
house of the profession in order. They have secured the adoption of codes
of legal ethics, beginning with the action of the Alabama Bar Association
in 1831 and leading to the adoption of a code by the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1908. They have organized or energized Grievance Commit-
tees which have brought about the discipline of many lawyers. They
have organized clinics for the study of the ethical problems which confront
lawyers. The best known of these clinics is that of the New York County
Lawyers' Association.
As testified by Mr. Charles A. Boston, who writes an introduction to
this book, Mr. Jessup has rendered valiant service in all these activities
in his own State of New York and in the American Bar Association. Mr.
Jessup has rendered the profession a real service in crystallizing the result
of his long experience and careful study and in making the result avail-
able for students, lawyers and judges. Included in the book is a wealth
of material for the student. Here, he will find the canons of ethics of the
American Bar Association, the canons of judicial ethics of the American
Bar Association, Sir Matthew Hale's Rules for the Guidance of Judicial
Officers, Hoffman's Resolutions in regard to Professional Deportment, the
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232 questions and answers expounded to and decided by the Committee on
Professional Ethics of the New York County Lawyers' Association, and
also, a summary of the cases in New York dealing with discipline of
lawyers. In addition, Mr. Jessup has given us a preface to the study of
legal ethics in his usual thoughtful and sententious manner, and has dis-
cussed some 92 questions of legal ethics, so selected as to make a student,
who has mastered all of the questions, thoroughly familiar with the entire
subject.
Mr. Jessup has chosen the title for his book advisedly. He thus makes a
definite choice of approach to a consideration of the ethical problems
which confront a lawyer. We may apply to the solution of such problems
three different kinds of standards; (1) the ideals of the best men in the
profession, (2) the actual practice of the man of "ordinary (ethical)
prudence", (3) the standards applied by the courts in disciplinary pro-
ceedings. In other words the standards are (1) the hope of the profes-
sion; (2) its practice, which unfortunately does not always measure up
to the hope; (3) what will "get by" the courts.
Mr. Jessup's interest is in the first field. He seeks, by persuasion, and
by an appeal to what is best in the student or practitioner, to urge him on
in the pursuit of the highest ideals of the profession. This problem of
approach is serious for those who attempt to teach legal ethics. The third
standard is out of the question. To teach the first unreservedly is to
send the student out to look for a world that does not exist. To teach
all the compromises of the middle standard is unsatisfactory. As Mr.
Jessup points out, some thoughtful men believe that legal ethics cannot be
taught. They say that a law student should be told to be honest in
thought, word and deed and that this touchstone will always enable him
to tell true metal from false. Perhaps this is so, but it leaves out of ac-
count the fact that a lawyer owes many duties to himself-to be honest
to his clients, to be loyal to the courts, to be honest and respectful to his
opponents, and to witnesses, to be fair and decent to the public and the
state, and to aid in the enforcement of law and order and the accomplish-
ment of justice. These d'uties result in a series of cross pulls of obliga-
tions. A lawyer cannot deal with his clients' problems as he would with
his own. For himself he might be willing to give another the benefit of
every doubt. For his client he may be required to submit every doubt to
the most searching inquiry.
Lawyers have dealt with these cross pulls for generations, and their
experience is of value to men dealing with them for the first time. For
instance, the cross pulls involved in the treatment of the communications
of a client to his counsel have troubled men as wise as Bentham. The ex-
perience of the profession furnishes the solution of the problem. Is it not
well that the prospective lawyer should study this experience?
Mr. Jessup lays great stress upon the fact that law is a profession
which, as he defines the word, means that those who follow it seek first to
render service, and that reward is incidental. He contrasts a profession
with a business, where the reward is the primary object. From this he
deduces certain rules as to advertising, the soliciting of business, etc.
This method of approach seems unsatisfactory. Many business men re-
gard the rendering of service as their main object, and feel that the re-
wards which come are incidental. Thus Henry Ford in My Life and Work
(p. 273) states a part of his creed as follows:
"The putting of service before profit. Without a profit a business can-
not extend. There is nothing inherently wrong about making a profit.
Well conducted business enterprises cannot fail to return a profit, but
profit must and inevitably will come as a reward for good service. It
cannot be the basis-it must be the result of service."
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In Rev. Mr. Heermance's collection of Codes of Ethics there appears
over and over again the notion that business exists primarily for service,
e.g. in the codes of the Iowa Concrete Products Association, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, National Retail Coal Dealers' Association,
American Warehousemen's Association, Retail Credit Men's National As-
sociation, National Association of Retail Grocers.
It is true that in the interest of the public and for his own comfort it
is desirable that a man should become a lawyer only if he believes that in
this profession he can do the best work of which he is capable. But is
this not true of the man who is to supply milk to our children? Does the
man who collects a milk bill render a service any more truly than the man
who furnishes good and wholesome milk? "The servant is worthy of his
hire". "After service comes reward". These apothegms state facts. We
know that lawyers who render real services receive rewards. Why blinl:
the facts?
Many law students are the sons and daughters of business men. Can
the older men in the profession say to these people, "The principles which
we apply to our own conduct are other and higher than those which -your
parents do, and should, apply to theirs"? The difficulties sought to be
solved by this formula seem susceptible of a solution by an analysis of
some of the factors involved. A lawyer acts for others. His profession
offers peculiar temptations to serve himself at the expense of his clients.
Many sins of this sort defy detection or punishment. So too, ill means
can be employed to a great extent with like immunity.
The securing of business by solicitation and advertisement creates so
great a desire to "deliver the goods" according to representation, that the
temptation to use ill means is greatly increased. This in itself justifies
the prohibition against solicitation and advertising. In serving a client a
lawyer, if he is true to his obligations, must consider the interests of his
client first, and in many cases to his own detriment. In other words, serv-
ice comes first in a peculiarly complete sense; but this is based on the duty
of loyalty to the client A like duty rests upon business men, at least
in certain occupations.
It seems better to state and emphasize the duty of loyalty rather than
to focus attention upon the notion of a profession, from which the same
duty may be implied. The difference between the obligations of a lawyer
and the obligations of some other men, is based primarily upon the fact
that the lawyer is acting for others, and dealing with their property, and,
perhaps, with their lives. Any other man who is put in the same situation
has the same obligation. An agent must be loyal to his principal. The
men in charge of a train must act in the light of the fact that the life of
every one of the passengers on it is in their keeping. Milk producers and
dealers recognize that on the wholesomeness of their product may depend
the health and lives of their customers.
Mr. Jessup, on page 63, incidentally corrects the generally accepted
version of the famous "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion" incident of the
Cleveland-Blaine campaign of 1884. On the authority of Judge Noah
Davis he states that Blaine's ignoring the remark was deliberate because
he felt that it was beneath his dignity to notice it, and that no one would
impute such a sentiment to him. Rhodes (Vol. VII. p. 225) and Stanwood
in his Life of Blaie (p. 289) indicates that Blaine did not notice the phrase
or did not appreciate its possibilities of harm to him. Paxon in the
New Nation (p. 133) takes the same view. Colonel McClure, a friend of
Blaine's, in Our Presidents and Hoo we Malc Thlcm (p. 311) gives a
somewhat more extended statement along the same line
